Former Sri Lanka Navy Commander Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda
The Navy could deal with asymmetrical warfare at sea with FACs and combined deployment of SBS and the Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS). The deployment of the SBS and RABS yielded excellent results minimizing damage to the Navy.
But confronting the Sea Tigers in the seas was not the only objective of the Navy.
We had to think of new strategies other than confronting Tiger boats disguising as fishing trawlers transporting arms and ammunition.
The far-sighted strategy of the Navy to go after the floating warehouses of the LTTE in the deep seas thousands of miles away from Sri Lanka became one of the turning points in Sri Lanka’s effort of defeating LTTE terrorism.
The SLN with limited blue water capability began intercepting the LTTE ships and their efforts paid dividends as they were able to destroy seven such ships which carrying a large stock of weapons, mortars, artillery ammunition, and parts of light aircraft, diving equipment, torpedoes, and speed boats, Electro Optic devices, under water vehicles, night vision devices and explosives during 2007 alone.
Those ships which were not flying any flag and did not carry proper International Maritime Organization (IMO) identification numbers were engaged in international waters off the shores of Sri Lanka.
What is more important in Naval history in this regard is the Navy’s performance of a very difficult task with great dedication by not waiting til arms smugglers came closer but going out to destroy those rogue ships in the high seas using special strategies based on long-term planning and careful analysis of information gathered over a period of time utilizing the Navy’s limited resources to the maximum